Friday, October 14, 2005

G8 Appeasement & Treason and The Far East: WWIII

DRAFT: A Work in Progress

G8 Appeasement & Treason and The Far East: WWIII

Ladies & Gentlemen of the World,

It is painfully clear that The Far East which includes Malaysia, India, & China have embarked on a Economic War since the 1990s with the Western Industrialized civilizations which is represented mainly by the G8 Nations which includes The United States, Europe, & Japan.

It appears that Communism has a new face, a face we can recognize on the surface like a iceberg: A Free Market Economy. But it is the unseen below sea level that concerns us all. I am quite sure that historical figures in the past such as President Harry S. Truman, General Douglas McArthur, Chairman Nikita Khrushchev of the USSR, President John F. Kennedy, & President Richard M. Nixon are rolling in the graves about now in response to the rise of The Far East Empire.

A former Supreme Allied Commander and Five-Star General was relieved of his command during the Korean War by President Truman due to General MacArthur's position on China and his insubordination to the Commander and Chief of the United States Armed Forces regarding the Chinese incursions into that war at the time. General MacArthur's position was to unleash atomic weapons & invade China and eliminate the flow of support from the Chinese to the North Koreans. President Truman did not intend on widening the Korean conflict and overruled General MacArthur's Chinese invasion plan. General MacArthur in response embarked on a support of his opinion campaign in the United States and to the United Nations to invalidate President Truman's decision. President Truman had no choice but to FIRE General MacArthur for insubordination. [1]

The History of the first half of the 20th Century in relation to The Far East, tells us that General MacArthur spent most of his military career in & around The Far East, which made him a top American specialist and advisor on the culture of The Far East to the United States military and government. The Japanese had attacked the United States in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on December 7th 1941 which forced the isolationistic country of the time into the throws of World War II. Two distinct Theaters of Operations were defined & military leadership was assigned by President Franklin D. Roosevelt: General Dwight Eisenhower of the European Theater and General Douglas MacArthur of the Pacific Theater. Resources were in short supply & restricted before the war and the Pacific Theater was prioritized as a secondary objective, Europe and Adolph Hitler were to remain to primary objective of the United States involvement in WWII. The Pacific Theater suffered incredible losses and setbacks until General MacArthur flexed his political talents and was thus rewarded more resources.

[More to come, but first ponder these images...]

"Peace is at hand", British Prime Minster Neville Chamberlain.

A warning for Malaysia, India, & China approaching 2010.

We've been there, done that before... are you ready for the Ultimate Sacrifice?

China's first atomic bomb was exploded Oct. 16, 1964 in the desert of Xinjiang.
My comment: It looks like we missed our golden opportunity to starve off another World War...Vietnam would never have happened either.

Why Did Truman Really Fire MacArthur? ... The Obscure History of Nuclear Weapons and the Korean War Provides the Answer
By Bruce Cumings

Mr. Cumings is the author of, North Korea: Another Country (2003) and co-author of, Inventing the Axis of Evil: The Truth About North Korea, Iran, and Syria (2004).

On 9 July 1950 -- just two weeks into the war, it is worth remembering -- MacArthur sent Ridgway a hot message that prompted the joint chiefs of staff (JCS) "to consider whether or not A-bombs should be made available to MacArthur." The chief of operations, General Charles Bolte, was asked to talk to MacArthur about using atomic bombs "in direct support [of] ground combat." Bolte thought 10-20 such bombs could be spared for Korea without unduly jeopardising US global war capabilities.

Boite received from MacArthur an early suggestion for the tactical use of atomic weapons and an indication of MacArthur's extraordinary ambitions for the war, which included occupying the North and handling potential Chinese -- or Soviet -- intervention: "I would cut them off in North Korea . . . I visualise a cul-de-sac. The only passages leading from Manchuria and Vladivostok have many tunnels and bridges. I see here a unique use for the atomic bomb -- to strike a blocking blow -- which would require a six months' repair job. Sweeten up my B-29 force."

At this point, however, the JCS rejected use of the bomb because targets large enough to require atomic weapons were lacking; because of concerns about world opinion five years after Hiroshima; and because the JCS expected the tide of battle to be reversed by conventional military means. But that calculation changed when large numbers of Chinese troops entered the war in October and November 1950.

At a famous news conference on 30 November President Harry Truman threatened use of the atomic bomb, saying the US might use any weapon in its arsenal. (10) The threat was not the faux pas many assumed it to be, but was based on contingency planning to use the bomb. On that same day, Air Force General George Stratemeyer sent an order to General Hoyt Vandenberg that the Strategic Air Command should be put on warning, "to be prepared to dispatch without delay medium bomb groups to the Far East . . . this augmentation should include atomic capabilities."

General Curtis LeMay remembered correctly that the JCS had earlier concluded that atomic weapons would probably not be useful in Korea, except as part of "an overall atomic campaign against Red China." But, if these orders were now being changed because of the entry of Chinese forces into the war, LeMay wanted the job; he told Stratemeyer that only his headquarters had the experience, technical training, and "intimate knowledge" of delivery methods. The man who had directed the firebombing of Tokyo in 1945 was again ready to proceed to the Far East to direct the attacks. (11) Washington was not worried that the Russians would respond with atomic weapons because the US possessed at least 450 bombs and the Soviets only 25.

On 9 December MacArthur said that he wanted commander's discretion to use atomic weapons in the Korean theatre. On 24 December he submitted "a list of retardation targets" for which he required 26 atomic bombs. He also wanted four to drop on the "invasion forces" and four more for "critical concentrations of enemy air power."

In interviews published posthumously, MacArthur said he had a plan that would have won the war in 10 days: "I would have dropped 30 or so atomic bombs . . . strung across the neck of Manchuria." Then he would have introduced half a million Chinese Nationalist troops at the Yalu and then "spread behind us -- from the Sea of Japan to the Yellow Sea -- a belt of radioactive cobalt . . . it has an active life of between 60 and 120 years. For at least 60 years there could have been no land invasion of Korea from the North." He was certain that the Russians would have done nothing about this extreme strategy: "My plan was a cinch." (12)

A second request

Cobalt 60 has 320 times the radioactivity of radium. One 400-ton cobalt H-bomb, historian Carroll Quigley has written, could wipe out all animal life on earth. MacArthur sounds like a warmongering lunatic, but he was not alone. Before the Sino-Korean offensive, a committee of the JCS had said that atomic bombs might be the decisive factor in cutting off a Chinese advance into Korea; initially they could be useful in "a cordon sanitaire [that] might be established by the UN in a strip in Manchuria immediately north of the Korean border." A few months later Congressman Albert Gore, Sr. (Father of former VP and 2000 Democratic candidate Al Gore, Jr., and subsequently a strong opponent of the Vietnam war) complained that "Korea has become a meat grinder of American manhood" and suggested "something cataclysmic" to end the war: a radiation belt dividing the Korean peninsula permanently into two.

Although Ridgway said nothing about a cobalt bomb, in May 1951, after replacing MacArthur as US commander in Korea, he renewed MacArthur's request of 24 December, this time for 38 atomic bombs. (13) The request was not approved.

The US came closest to using atomic weapons in April 1951, when Truman removed MacArthur. Although much related to this episode is still classified, it is now clear that Truman did not remove MacArthur simply because of his repeated insubordination, but because he wanted a reliable commander on the scene should Washington decide to use nuclear weapons; Truman traded MacArthur for his atomic policies. On 10 March 1951 MacArthur asked for a "D-Day atomic capability" to retain air superiority in the Korean theatre, after the Chinese massed huge new forces near the Korean border and after the Russians put 200 bombers into airbases in Manchuria (from which they could strike not just Korea but also US bases in Japan). (14) On 14 March General Vandenberg wrote: "Finletter and Lovett alerted on atomic discussions. Believe everything is set."

At the end of March Stratemeyer reported that atomic bomb loading pits at Kadena Air Base on Okinawa were again operational; the bombs were carried there unassembled, and put together at the base, lacking only the essential nuclear cores. On 5 April the JCS ordered immediate atomic retaliation against Manchurian bases if large numbers of new troops came into the fighting, or, it appears, if bombers were launched from there against US assets. On that day the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Gordon Dean, began arrangements for transferring nine Mark IV nuclear capsules to the Air Force's 9th Bomb Group, the designated carrier for atomic weapons.

The JCS again considered the use of nuclear weapons in June 1951, this time in tactical battlefield circumstances (15) and there were many more such suggestions as the war continued to 1953. Robert Oppenheimer, former director of the Manhattan Project, was involved in Project Vista, designed to gauge the feasibility of the tactical use of atomic weapons. In 1951 young Samuel Cohen, on a secret assignment for the US Defence Department, observed the battles for the second recapture of Seoul and thought there should be a way to destroy the enemy without destroying the city. He became the father of the neutron bomb. (16)

The most terrifying nuclear project in Korea, however, was Operation Hudson Harbour. It appears to have been part of a larger project involving "overt exploitation in Korea by the Department of Defence and covert exploitation by the Central Intelligence Agency of the possible use of novel weapons" -- a euphemism for what are now called weapons of mass destruction.


Anonymous Anonymous said...

Absolutely dumb post...nothing of substance really. Go read some books and keep up with the latest news before posting such trash.

9:57 AM  
Blogger mmasters said...

I really value the post of cowards that post anonymously ;-)

6:11 AM  

Post a Comment

<< Home